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Abstract.
The second part of this issue of Genocide Studies and Prevention presents an essen- tial article on
the debates in the UN Security Council in 1994, which determined whether or not to intervene in
the Rwandan Genocide.
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Editor’s Introduction
The second part of this issue of Genocide Studies and Prevention presents an essen-
tial article on the debates in the UN Security Council in 1994, which determined
whether or not to intervene in the Rwandan Genocide.
Karel Kovanda, who was the Czech Republic’s ambassador to the Security
Council during these debates, provides an insider’s account of the fascinating
and troubling discussions. The Czech Republic was a newly independent nation in
1994, and Kovanda participated in the debates as a non-permanent member of the
Security Council.
Kovanda’s discussion relies on internal documents from the Czech Foreign
Service as well as on his own private notes and published information. He lays out
the step-by-step evolution of the Rwandan tragedy and notes how the UN Secretariat
was receiving, and passing on to the Security Council, insufficient and biased infor-
mation, while NGOs had more accurate accounts of what was taking place. For the
most part, he demonstrates that the Security Council spent most of its time focusing
on the war between the Rwandan government and the Rwandan Patriotic Front
(RPF) and paid little attention—about 20% of its time, he estimates—on UNAMIR.
It took weeks, according to Kovanda, for the Security Council to finally come to grips
with the genocide. Kovanda notes that he was the first to employ this term publicly
at an official UN meeting.
Kovanda’s discussion exposes the inner working of the Security Council during
a time of crisis. He also describes the mechanisms that, as he notes, ‘‘ play a role
in the day-to-day workings of the UNSC, such as the role of the UN Secretariat,
informal consultations, groupings of UNSC members,’’ and many other considera-
tions. Kovanda’s insider account exposes the weaknesses of the Security Council
and the reluctance on the part of many members to forthrightly confront an ongoing
genocide. As such, it may be taken as an important point of departure for analyses of
potential reforms that are necessary to make genocide prevention a reality.
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